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Home>Connection scoring beats spam filtering

Windows Secrets Newsletter • Issue 68 • 2006-01-26 • Circulation: over 400,000


Table of contents 
  • Top Story: Connection scoring beats spam filtering
  • Over the Horizon: Wireless ‘flaw’ could leave computers open
  • Patch Watch: When does ‘not critical’ mean ‘critical’?
  • Woody's Windows: How to slim down your porky pics
  • Perimeter Scan: When is a flaw really a back door?

 
Top Story

Connection scoring beats spam filtering

By Brian Livingston

A simple device that prevents spammers from delivering junk to your mail server outperforms complex spam filtering appliances costing up to seven times as much, according to tests by the Windows Secrets Newsletter.

If your company is suffering from onslaughts of spam, our tests indicate that this new approach can halt more than 99% of your unwanted flow without blocking legitimate e-mail. Best of all, the new technology does this without creating a large “quarantine” of suspected spam that you or your employees must manually comb through.

Significantly, the innovative device we tested has never been reviewed by any computer magazine, despite the fact that it’s been on sale for months. The reasons for this are an intriguing part of our story.

The little box that stops spammers

Deep six ds200 The antispam appliance that inspired our testing is the Deep Six Technologies Spamwall DS200 (photo, left). This little gizmo is only 5″ by 6″ and just 1″ deep (11 x 13 x 2 cm). You configure it to receive your e-mail before the messages hit your mail server. The device uses “connection scoring” to accept transmission attempts from legitimate senders and reject attempts from servers that are sending spam. We found it to be extremely accurate in making the distinction between spam senders and “ham” (legitimate) senders.

Since the DS200 is a hardware device that protects an e-mail server, it’s primarily useful to companies that operate their own servers. This includes most large businesses, of course. But also includes many small and medium businesses that have registered their own domain names, such as Example.com.

Home users, who receive their e-mail via an Internet service provider, such as AOL.com, may still see some benefit. The technology within the DS200 could easily improve these ISPs’ own spam rejection rates, helping their customers see less spam.

Testing against thousands of spams per day

To test Deep Six’s real-world performance, we invited major antispam appliance makers to send us whichever of their models they thought was the appropriate scale for small to medium businesses. We received units from all the invitees: Barracuda, Borderware, F-Secure, IronPort, and Network Box. The Deep Six DS200 unit we reviewed was provided by Tyrnstone Systems Inc., a small network consulting company in Seattle, Wash., that sells the device to the SMB market. Deep Six Technologies itself is an intellectual property development company in Tustin, Calif.

Invariably, the appliance vendors (other than Deep Six) sent us devices that combine antispam functions with a firewall, antivirus capabilities, or other features. I was assisted in running technical tests on the devices over a period of six weeks by Brent Scheffler, program director of WindowsSecrets.com. We tested all devices only for their ability to reject spam and accept ham, for the following reasons.

An antispam appliance that also offers antivirus filtering is not in itself adequade to protect against internal virus infections. Viruses can enter a LAN via a roaming USB drive, a laptop brought in from the outside, and many other ways. For this reason, companies need to run antivirus software even if an antivirus appliance is in place. "We’re a perimeter-based device, we’re not providing host-based security," explained Scott Rosen, Network Box’s president for North America, in a telephone interview.

By contrast, spam cannot enter a company except via e-mail. An antispam appliance on the network perimeter, therefore, can offer complete protection against spam. Adware, unauthorized server access, and other threats require their own specialized layers of defense. In our review, for this reason, we tested only the devices’ antispam performance. Firewalls, antivirus protection, and other security functions can and should be configured and tested separately.

Because WindowsSecrets.com doesn’t have a fully equipped test lab, we seldom rate hardware ourselves, leaving this to the publishing giants that can afford it. In this case, however, we do operate in-house a full installation of Exchange Server 2003 supporting five users on the SBS version of Windows Server 2003. We decided to see if we could dedicate this server to serious junk-mail testing.

Before we designed our test suite, we had thought we were targeted by very little spam. Our personal e-mail addresses were presenting us with only one or two spam messages a day. This is because we "spam-proofed" these addresses two years ago. (See our e-book about spam-proofing, above.) Our public, "editor" Windows Secrets e-mail address does receive several virus-infected e-mails a day. This is because we ask our readers to put our address into their "safe senders" lists, where (unfortunately) viruses easily find it. But these e-mails are reliably detected and quarantined by the server-managed antivirus software we run, so we never had to deal with these messages.

When we started building the test suite, however, we found to our surprise that more than 3,000 spam messages were actually being directed to our mail server every day. Most of this spam, we determined, was being sent to old e-mail addresses of mine that I never use any more. These addresses had been posted in plain text at InfoWorld.com, BriansBuzz.com, and other Web sites two or more years ago.

We’d never noticed this flow because our Exchange Server was already dismissing virtually all of it. The server had been correctly configured to accept messages only to the few e-mail addresses we currently use. Any spammers who did somehow get our real addresses were also mostly rejected. The IP addresses of almost all top spammers are published in the so-called SBL and XBL block lists by Spamhaus.org, a respected antispam organization based in the U.K. Our Exchange Server was rejecting any connections from the hardcore spam servers that managed to get listed in SBL or XBL.

Fortunately, we were able to set up realistic tests, despite the fact that our inboxes rarely showed evidence of any junk. Antispam appliances, by definition, must be placed "in front of" a mail server. With no access to our server’s rule base, these devices had to figure out by themselves which incoming connections were from spammers and which were legit.

We took several steps to make the testing fair. We devoted a day to each device to configure it according to its maker’s instructions. We then spent a full day "tuning" each device to reduce false positives (ham rejected as spam). Starting after Christmas, each appliance was then left alone to process a live, incoming mail stream for an entire work day (no weekends or holidays were used for live testing). More than 3,300 messages were processed by each device during its final, 24-hour test period.

Out of those thousands of messages, how well could these products separate out the 5% or so that were legitimate e-mails?

Zero false positives at an affordable price

The following table, sorted by false positives and then false negatives, shows that antispam appliances have become quite accurate. Three of the devices — from Barracuda, IronPort, and Deep Six — achieved a perfect score of 0.00% in rejecting legitimate messages, mistaking none of them for spam.

These three products also showed extremely good performance at filtering out junk. The IronPort let no spam into our inboxes, achieving a perfect false-negative score of 0.00%. The Barracuda accepted only 0.02% and the Deep Six accepted only 0.09%.

We consider the tiny differences between these scores to be statistical noise. All of the three top-rated devices essentially rejected no legitimate e-mail and accepted no significant amount of spam. (Any spam message that made it to our inboxes was considered a false negative. We did not allow grey areas, such as mail that "might be spam" but was placed in our inboxes anyway.)

Shown in Table 1 for comparison is our original configuration of Exchange Server 2003. This was the only strategy we found to be less expensive than the DS200. We configured Exchange to reject all mail sent to nonvalid e-mail addresses and block IP addresses found on the SBL or XBL lists. This scheme is essentially free (not counting our admin time and Exchange itself). But we found it allows significantly more spam to get through — 0.37% — which is more than all but one other contender in our tests.

Antispam test chart
Table 1: The Deep Six DS200 let through only 0.09% of spam but is low in cost.

The Deep Six device has a list price of only $999 for an unlimited number of e-mail accounts. This is a one-time investment and the device requires no ongoing fees. The IronPort model we tested is much more costly, listing for $2,999 to protect up to 100 e-mail accounts in its first year. The Barracuda lists for $4,899 in the first year for an unlimited number of accounts. All of the antispam appliances, other than the Deep Six, require the payment of ongoing license fees to continue the services after the first 12 months.

The bottom line: We consider the Deep Six technology to provide an antispam defense that’s as good as or better than the competing appliances, while costing only a fraction of the price.

How the Deep Six technology works

The Deep Six device operates completely differently than the other antispam appliances tested. The competing solutions are all modified PCs running Unix or some variant. They occupy either a mini-tower case or a 1U, rack-mounted server case. They include large hard drives to store configuration information, log files, and/or any “quarantined” mail that’s judged to be spam.

Because these devices are designed for use in a glass-house server room, they tend to be noisy. The fans on one unit, the F-Secure, were so loud that we had to raise our voices to converse in the otherwise-quiet office where the system was temporarily located.

The Deep Six DS200, by contrast, is simply a solid-state circuit board with no moving parts. As a result, it’s absolutely silent. This makes it a welcome addition to small offices and home offices, which don’t usually have soundproofed server cages.

More important is the theory that underlies the Deep Six technology. The implications of this concept have permanently changed some of my deeply held beliefs about spam.

Deep Six does not perform “content filtering” to compute a spam score based on the words found in a message’s body or headers. Instead, the DS200 performs "connection rating." It accepts or rejects any distant server’s attempt to make a connection (called a Simple Mail Transport Protocol or SMTP connection) solely according to the characteristics of the sending server.

One way Deep Six does this is by checking the IP address of the distant server to see if it is on one of several dozen “real-time block lists.” The DS200, however, does not disconnect a server merely because its IP address appears on a single list, as many antispam schemes do. Instead, according to a source close to Deep Six Technologies, the device is programmed to use a “network decision tree.”

The inclusion of an IP address on Block List A might not cause Deep Six to drop an SMTP connection attempt. But if the IP address is also on Block Lists C and E, then the sending server is considered to a spam bot. (Our source requested not to be identified by name, saying this technique is the subject of two U.S. patent applications and the details of the technology have not yet been made public.)

The DS200 also resolves "close calls" in an effective way. If a sending server might or might not be a spam server, based on the decision tree, Deep Six asks the sending server to re-try the SMTP connection a few seconds later. Legitimate e-mail servers do this automatically, following well-understood Internet mail standards. Spam servers, however, are programmed not to bother. Sending millions of pieces of spam per day is far more important to spammers than wasting any time responding to SMTP retry requests.

Because these re-tries occur infrequently, and only when a sending server falls into a grey area, I support this type of testing. I generally oppose “Penny Black” schemes, in which all senders, legitimate or otherwise, are required to expend CPU resources to “prove” their worth.

How the DS200 has changed my thinking

The success of the DS200 in our tests has forced me to change my positions on some controversial antispam techniques:

Before: I’ve previously written that antispam block lists should not be used to make a black-and-white, Yes/No decision about e-mail messages. That’s because these lists sometimes add an innocent mail server by mistake.

After: My experience with Deep Six has completely altered my opinion. Using dozens of block lists to create an intelligent decision tree seems to totally eliminate the false-positive problem.

Before: I’ve also written in the past that you shouldn’t delete messages ranked as “probable spam,” in case errors were made by faulty spam filters. Instead, I felt that a quarantine folder should be maintained and examined to retrieve legitimate messages that were falsely shunted aside by filters.

After: With the Deep Six technology, I believe a quarantine folder is no longer necessary. I have no qualms about using this device, given its accuracy, to reject spam connections without accepting and quarantining the spam or ever looking at it.

One of my opinions that’s grown stronger due to my testing is that holding spam and then ranking the content of the messages won’t work forever. I once wrote that the geometric increase in the volume of spam each year would make this storage-and-ranking process too costly for companies in the long run.

In a telephone interview, John Reid, a volunteer with Spamhaus.org, expressed a similiar notion. “Accepting every message that’s sent to you, and then churning through them — it gets very hardware intensive.”

Deep Six eliminates content filtering and quarantine folders altogether. This reduces the load on your mail server substantially. Best of all, there’s no need for you or your co-workers to ever slog through a “Possible Spam” folder looking for misfiled messages. That folder, after all, is certain to consist mostly of phishing attempts, phony pill offers, and worse. That’s exactly the kind of stuff you don’t want anyone in your company to spend time dealing with.

The DS200 was so effective in our tests that I have no concerns about rejecting SMTP connections from servers it deems to be spam bots. Even if some legitimate e-mail user somehow gets associated with a spam server, Deep Six’s effective feedback system minimizes false-positive problems. Allow me to explain.

How Deep Six’s feedback loop works

When Deep Six rejects an SMTP connection, it doesn’t just drop it. Instead, it responds with a standard error code known as a “550.” Companies that use the Deep Six device can include human-readable text in the 550 body. The sending server then displays this text in the e-mail program of whomever sent the message (if a real person was the sender). In our case, the text reads:
  • “Our antispam system has rejected the IP address of your mail server. If this is in error, please use the contact page on our Web site to send us your message or call us at +1 206-282-2536.”
If your company has only one domain name that’s being protected by a DS200, you can insert the actual URL of your contact page, or any other information you like.

Spammers will never see or read this text. Even if they did, they certainly won’t type a spam message by hand into your contact form. But this provides an easy way for any accidentally bounced, legitimate sender to let you know. (Your site must have a contact page for this to work, but that’s a good idea anyway.)

It’s important to note that the DS200 does not send a “bounce” e-mail message to anyone. That would make it as bad as the spammers. Instead, the text of the 550 error is strictly contained within the electronic handshaking that your receiving mail server does with the sending server. No reply e-mails are ever generated.

Other antispam appliances can and do send error codes, of course. We simply feel that the DS200′s emphasis on using handshaking to convey alternate contact methods to hapless senders is particularly effective.

If someone ever does complain to you about a bounced message, the DS200 allows you to put the person’s spammy IP address on a “safe senders” list. Everything from that IP address will then get through. Rather than doing this, however, I believe you should ask the sender to virus-scan his or her server, in case it’s infected by a spam bot.

In reality, it’s very unlikely that an ordinary person sending innocent e-mails through AOL or Yahoo will have the same IP address as a spam bot. Major ISPs transmit their users’ legitimate e-mails from static IP addresses devoted to this purpose. If a spam bot infects a user’s PC, the program doesn’t spew its junk through an ISP’s static addresses. The risk of detection is too high.

Instead, the bot installs its own, tiny SMTP server and spews out junk through whatever dynamic IP address the person has been assigned by his or her ISP. These dynamic IP addresses should never be the origin of legitimate bulk e-mails. That makes them fairly easy for well-managed block lists to detect.

The Achilles heel of spammers is the fact that they must send their massive quantities of e-mails from somewhere. According to Spamhaus’s Reid, the top 200 spammers send out 80% to 90% of all spam worldwide, and the top 10 send out 80% to 90% of that. Whether the machines sending this spam are bot-infected PCs or bought-off Web hosts in the Third World, any IP address that sends millions of spams and little or no legitimate e-mail is going to stand out like a beacon. That’s why Deep Six is able to stop it.

It’s true that no record exists in a quarantine folder of any false positive that the DS200 may mistakenly bounce. But I believe our tests show that the count is effectively zero. Because the device is so effective — and blissfully silent — we put it back into service every time some other device’s testing was completed. That means that, after the DS200′s testing was complete, we ended up using it for more than 30 of the past 60 days. Not a single person has ever contacted us to say his or her e-mail bounced.

Considering how vocal my readers are, it’s inconceivable that no one would have notified me through my contact page about such a problem. I’m buying the reviewed DS200 unit and plan to continue using it to protect my office indefinitely.

Why you haven’t heard about Deep Six

I devoted eight weeks to hands-on testing of antispam appliances partly because Tyrnstone Systems said it couldn’t get major computer magazines to include its device in comparative reviews. In my opinion, the company’s small size is one reason this device has been overlooked. But it’s also because Deep Six’s approach is hard to test.

Spam reviews are usually conducted using a large “corpus” of spam and ham messages. One server sends the messages to another server, which is protected by a particular filtering product. The number of hits and misses are then calculated.

This method won’t work on the DS200. The device isn’t scoring the content of the messages, but the reputation of the sending server. Since the originating server in artificial testing is the same for every message, all the e-mails pass or they all fail.

The Deep Six technology can only be tested when placed in front of a live mail server, using a live stream of e-mails, and scoring live SMTP connections. This is the reason our tests took several weeks. No two devices could be tested on our mail server at the same time. They had to be scheduled one after the other.

I urge major computer magazines to devote the resources needed to test Deep Six against competing spam solutions. The DS200 technology may provide valuable insights into the spam menace and how it can be permanently stopped using technical methods.

To purchase a DS200 and test it on your own company’s mail stream, visit Tyrnstone Systems. For more information on the technology itself, visit Deep Six Technologies.

Both are tiny companies, so if their Web sites become slow or unresponsive from thousands of Windows Secrets readers visiting them, try again the following day.

The Deep Six site claims that the DS200 device is capable of handling peaks of “10 connections per second.” David Gerhart, CEO of Tyrnstone, says it’s his experience that the unit can reliably handle as many as 50 SMTP attempts per second. For larger volumes of mail, multiple DS200s can be employed. Each unit is given its own static IP address to balance the inbound load. Deep Six’s connection-scoring function can even be performed offsite as a hosted service. This allows even fairly large companies to try the technology for themselves.

If you do add one or more DS200s to your network, be sure to correctly set up your "secondary MX records." I described the procedures for this in my Executive Tech columns of Jan. 3 and Jan. 24.

I’ll be looking forward to any independent test results that come out. If you do any testing, or you’d like to send us a tip on any other subject, visit WindowsSecrets.com/contact. You’ll receive a gift certificate for a book, CD, or DVD of your choice if you send us a comment that we print. Thanks for your help.

Brian Livingston is editor of the Windows Secrets Newsletter and the coauthor of Windows 2000 Secrets, Windows Me Secrets, and eight other books.
 

 
Over the Horizon

Wireless ‘flaw’ could leave computers open

Chris mosby
There’s been a lot of talk about the Windows Wi-Fi “flaw” that was revealed recently.

Some security professionals call it a high-risk vulnerability. Meanwhile, Microsoft and other security professionals call it a feature — one that can only be exploited under the right circumstances. Let’s take a closer look, so you can be the judge.


Is it a ‘flaw’ or a ‘feature’?

This is the question that a lot of computer security professionals are asking themselves after Mark Loveless — also known as “Simple Nomad” — revealed a flaw in how Windows Wi-Fi networking is setup by default, at the recent hacker convention known as ShmooCon 2006

The “flaw” comes from the way Windows searches for a wireless network connection. At startup, Windows searches for a wireless access point to connect to. If Windows can’t find one, it creates an ad hoc network, using the SSID of the last connection.

Other computers that search for the same SSID can look for matching connections and make a peer-to-peer network between the two computers, according to Loveless. When this happens, a hacker could possibly introduce a virus or Trojan onto the first computer or look at the files located on the first computer’s hard drive. This method of connection could even spread from computer to computer in a “virus-like” manner.

Loveless describes it in his advisory this way:

  • Alice has a wireless access point at home with an SSID of linksys. She’s successfully set it up and connected to it with her laptop;
     
  • Alice goes to the airport (or train station or coffee shop) and opens her laptop.
     
  • Bob, who’s sitting next to Alice, has a laptop configured with an ad hoc network advertising an SSID of linksys.
     
  • Alice’s laptop, when started, looks for the SSID of linksys and unknowingly attaches to Bob’s ad-hoc network;
     
  • The next time Alice boots up her laptop when an Ethernet cable is not attached and there’s no linksys SSID in range, Alice starts advertising an ad-hoc network with an SSID of linksys.
This happens on Windows 2000, Windows XP, and XP SP1 in the background, without the user’s knowledge or permission.

On Windows XP SP2, Loveless says, “the user is notified it has ‘attached’ to an ad-hoc network, when in fact it has simply started advertising the ad-hoc network.” In real-world tests, Loveless claimed that he could have connected to 11 different laptops while on airline flights using the methods explained above

You’ll have to fix this yourself

According to Loveless, Microsoft was notified of the problem in mid-October. Since then, the company has confirmed the issue but says a fix will not be available until the next Service Pack. That means never for Windows 2000, and not until the second half of 2007 for Windows XP.

Officially, Microsoft has not acknowledged this as a vulnerability but as a feature that is doing what it is designed to do. As George Ou, a tech blogger for ZDnet.com, points out in a blog entry, “Microsoft never acknowledged this as a vulnerability. I checked with a Microsoft spokesperson and they confirmed that Microsoft Security Research Center states that this is not a security vulnerability. This is what I suspected all along because by definition, a software vulnerability is when software can be made to do something it wasn’t designed to do. This [so-called vulnerability] is actually a feature designed into every wireless ‘supplicant’ (that’s IEEE speak for ‘client’) software in the world because it is a fundamental and critical feature of the IEEE 802.11 protocol.”

How to protect against this ‘feature’

What to do: The easiest way to protect yourself is to use a firewall. Any will do, even the one that comes with Windows XP SP2. I recommend using the setup described in Brian’s Security Baseline for the best protection.

You can also disable your wireless connection when not in use, or reconfigure your wireless connection so it will only connect to access points, not other laptops.

To reconfigure your connection, click the Wireless icon in your System Tray, then open the Wireless Connection window. From there, click Change advanced settings. In the Wireless Network Connection Properties window, click on the Wireless Networks tab. Then click on the Advanced button and click Access point (infrastructure) networks only.

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Patch Watch

When does ‘not critical’ mean ‘critical’?

Susan bradley
You are at risk. No, seriously. Every time you turn on any kind of technology, you turn on risk.

The question for today is this: Exactly how do you know what risk you are taking when you use that technology? Some argue that “old code” is secure code, under the assumption that the older the code, the more “eyes” have reviewed it. But is that true? Let’s revisit the Windows Metafile issue with this in mind, shall we?


MS06-001 (912919)
The risk of using Windows 98 and Me

By now, those of you running the Windows 98 and Me operating systems probably know that Microsoft is not planning to release any patch for the WMF flaw. This vulnerability is corrected in Windows 2000, XP, and 2003 by using security bulletin MS06-001, which was released on Jan. 5.

(Eset, the maker of NOD32 antivirus software, has released an unofficial patch that is said to eliminate WMF risk on Windows 9x, Me, and NT systems. But this patch is little needed, as most updated antivirus programs, including NOD32, now detect and quarantine infected WMF images.)

The stated reason that Microsoft will not be preparing a patch is that for the older platforms, the flaw is not of a critical nature. But here’s the rub. What’s your definition of critical?

In my firm, I’ll be the first to tell you that I don’t want 98 or Me computers, since they lack fundamental tools that I need to manage them. I can’t patch them remotely. I can’t review their event viewer and use Web sites like EventID.net to investigate issues. I can’t ensure they have passwords and log access. I can’t audit the machines and set policies remotely. All of these things I cannot do on a 98 or Me platform. All of these things I care about. But the average home computer system, understandably, does not.

Some folks I know fault the XP platform for being more exposed to risks, because it (especially pre-SP2) was much more readily available to external access. For example, the Windows 98 platform wasn’t at issue for Messenger spam, isn’t vulnerable (as XP is) to the WMF flaw — as described by Stephen Toulouse on the Microsoft Security Response Center blog — and certainly doesn’t have a wireless Internet “feature” that can be used maliciously.

While Steve Riley in his blog can take journalists to task for overreacting to vague security threats, there are some writers who argue the opposite: That Windows 98 (until a machine dies from old age) is a securable platform for home users, as long as they have a third-party firewall and an antivirus program. It’s the classic Microsoft problem of an operating system being “good enough” for the needs of the home user.

So now we come to the question of the WMF vulnerability. Under Microsoft’s definitions, a “Critical” flaw strictly means an issue that requires no end-user interaction to infect a machine.

In today’s world of ever-increasing social engineering and phishing attacks, is it reasonable that the lack of human interaction should be the line drawn between "Critical" and "non-Critical"? Even on XP machines, it’s relatively trivial to trick someone into clicking and downloading malicious things (assuming they have Admin rights, as recently documented in a Microsoft whitepaper).

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Woody's Windows

How to slim down your porky pics

Woody leonhard
Those 8-megapixel cameras take great pictures, don’t they? Faaaaaaat. In more ways than one.

The top complaint I’ve heard since the holidays has nothing to do with rootkits, WMF files, or patches of patches. Nope. The people I know who scream the loudest got expensive new cameras, and they’ve learned that they can’t do much with their pictures.


Having your cake and eating it, too

You didn’t really think you’d get those gorgeous new high-resolution pictures free, did you? Robert Heinlein said it best — There Ain’t No Such Thing as a Free Lunch. No matter what you do, one of the prices you pay for really great picture quality is really huge files.

Send a handful of Christmas pics to a friend, and you may wipe out her inbox. Send a few to your parents or your great-aunt Mabel, who’s still using dial-up AOL, and it may be Valentine’s Day before they get them downloaded.

The funny part: You rarely need (or even want) all of the high definition that you paid so dearly to obtain. Yes, sometimes you want to make an 11-by-14-inch print, so you can hang your cat on the wall and admire the bits of Kibbles caught in his whiskers. But almost all of the time, the pictures you take rarely venture beyond a plain-vanilla computer screen. Big picture files are just overkill — expensive overkill, at that.

A free solution — from Microsoft!

OK. I lied. Or maybe Heinlein did. Sometimes there is such a thing as a free lunch.

Microsoft has (yet another) PowerToy that lets you reduce the size of your picture files. When you run a picture through the Image Resizer PowerToy, you lose some of that high definition: the resulting file is much smaller in size, and it’s also grainier. If you slim down a file using the Image Resizer, then print an 11-by-14 of your cat, you might not be able to tell the brand of food stuck on his whiskers. Get the picture?.

As with all the PowerToys, Microsoft says it doesn’t support Image Resizer — although the Redmondians developed it, distribute it, refer to it in many places on their Web site, their tech support people recommend it, and so on. It’s another one of those best-supported unsupported products on the Internet. Unlike TweakUI, which has multiple versions for all modern versions of Windows, the Image Resizer only works with Windows XP and Windows 2003 Server.

Get yer Image Resizer here

To install the Image Resizer PowerToy, go to the Windows XP PowerToys home page. Download the file on the right called ImageResizer.exe. This is a little confusing, but the file that gets downloaded is actually called ImageResizerPowerToySetup.exe.

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Perimeter Scan

When is a flaw really a back door?

Ryan russell
How quickly do your vendors release patches? If they take 15 years, does that mean the problem was an intentional backdoor?

There are, to be sure, some still-outstanding questions regarding how the now-infamous Windows Metafile flaw affects the Windown 9x/Me platform (as discussed by my fellow columnist, Susan). One bit of controversy that arose over this problem since our last newsletter deserves clarification here.


Was the WMF hole left on purpose?

On an Internet radio show with Leo Laporte, Steve Gibson on Jan. 12 essentially made the claim that the WMF flaw was a “back door” that Microsoft had intentionally left in Windows.

Before I add my voice to the chorus claiming Steve is wrong, I want to at least acknowledge that none of us can really prove 100 percent that he is or that he isn’t correct. You can’t prove that any of the many vulnerabilities that exist aren’t an intentional back door left by the developer.

Or, to be slightly more accurate, you can only prove the positive case. You can only know that it was an intentional backdoor if the developer admits it. And if it was intentional, why would someone admit it? There’s always some possibility, however small, that what looks like a mistake was actually intentional. All you can do is judge based on the available evidence.

First, Gibson himself has severely softened his claim that this was an intentional back door. As I’m writing this, I’m listening to the Jan. 23 edition of Steve and Leo’s radio show (no transcription available yet). In it, Gibson says that he shouldn’t have used the word “back door,” since it’s a loaded term. He also says that maybe the word “intentional” was a little strong, as well. So if you, like many people, took those words to mean what they mean, I’d like to dispute the claim from that standpoint first.

In this case, I’m using Hanlon’s Razor, which says, “Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by stupidity.”

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The Windows Secrets Newsletter is published weekly on the 1st through 4th Thursdays of each month, plus occasional news updates. We skip an issue on the 5th Thursday of any month, the week of Thanksgiving, and the last two weeks of August and December. Windows Secrets is a continuation of four merged publications: Brian's Buzz on Windows and Woody's Windows Watch in 2004, the LangaList in 2006, and the Support Alert Newsletter in 2008.

Publisher: WindowsSecrets.com, 1218 Third Ave., Suite 1515, Seattle, WA 98101 USA. Vendors, please send no unsolicited packages to this address (readers' letters are fine).

Editor in chief: Tracey Capen. Senior editors: Fred Langa, Woody Leonhard. Copyeditor: Roberta Scholz. Program director: Tony Johnston. Contributing editors: Yardena Arar, Susan Bradley, Scott Dunn, Michael Lasky, Scott Mace, Ryan Russell, Lincoln Spector, Robert Vamosi, Becky Waring. Product manager: Andy Boyd. Advertising director: Eric Gilley.

Trademarks: Microsoft and Windows are registered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation. The Windows Secrets series of books is published by Wiley Publishing Inc. The Windows Secrets Newsletter, WindowsSecrets.com, Support Alert, LangaList, LangaList Plus, WinFind, Security Baseline, Patch Watch, Perimeter Scan, Wacky Web Week, the Logo Design (W, S or road, and Star), and the slogan Everything Microsoft Forgot to Mention all are trademarks and service marks of WindowsSecrets.com. All other marks are the trademarks or service marks of their respective owners.

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Copyright © 2012 by WindowsSecrets.com. All rights reserved.

Table of contents

Top-scoring articles in the past 12 months
  • Leaving long cookie trails throughout the Web 5.00
  • Windows-like security for Android devices 5.00
  • Win7′s no-reformat, nondestructive reinstall 4.53
  • The sorry tale of the (un)Secure Sockets Layer 4.42
  • RPV: Win7′s least-known data-protection system 4.33
  • Recovery: the last step in total data security 4.30
  • Time for a .NET update we can’t ignore 4.30
  • Getting the most from Windows Search — Part 1 4.25
  • Revising printing habits saves money and trees 4.25
  • Upgrades end in erratic, partial hangs 4.25
  • Pros and cons of a ‘keyfile’ password 4.21
  • Beating back Duku and a plethora of other threats 4.20
  • Office 2007 gets its final service pack 4.19
  • Putting Registry-/system-cleanup apps to the test 4.19
  • One year and 99 security bulletins later 4.18
  • 1.8TB external drive goes down hard 4.17
  • Don’t pay for software you don’t need — Part 3 4.16
  • Internet Explorer gets another round of patches 4.15
  • Is your free AV tool a ‘resource pig?’ 4.15
  • Vacation’s over; it’s a big round of patches 4.15
  • Remote access leads to remote attacks 4.15
  • Keeping you up to date: say no to .NET — again 4.14
  • Take control of Google’s privacy policy settings 4.14
  • Office File Validation patch leads to problems 4.14
  • The advanced system-recover toolkit 4.13
  • New “419″ scam involves PayPal and Western Union 4.12
  • Readers’ best personal-privacy tips 4.11
  • Getting the most from Windows Search — Part 2 4.11
  • Re-examining Dropbox and its alternatives 4.10
  • Easily edit Windows’ right-click context menus 4.09
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Trademarks: Microsoft and Windows are registered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation. The Windows Secrets series of books is published by Wiley Publishing Inc. The Windows Secrets Newsletter, WindowsSecrets.com, WinFind, Windows Gizmos, Security Baseline, Patch Watch, Perimeter Scan, Wacky Web Week, the Logo Design (W, S or road, and Star), and the slogan Everything Microsoft Forgot to Mention all are trademarks and service marks of iNET Interactive. All other marks are the trademarks or service marks of their respective owners.
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